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In this paper we present the quantum control attack on quantum key distribution systems. The
cornerstone of the attack is that Eve can use unitary (polar) decomposition of her positive-operator
valued measure elements, which allows her to realize the feed-forward operation (quantum control),
change the states in the channel after her measurement and impose them to Bob. Below we consider
the general eavesdropping strategy and the conditions those should be satisfied to provide the attack
successfully. Moreover we consider several types of the attack, each of them is based on a different
type of discrimination. We also provide the example on two non-orthogonal states and discuss
different strategies in this case.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) systems [1, 2] in the
last decades extends beyond the laboratory research and
go straight ahead to the market. Nevertheless a lot of
vulnerabilities for real QKD systems are not covered in
the various researches in both theoretical and experimen-
tal areas. Its is well-known that all implemented equip-
ment is non-ideal. Due to this fact some attacks can be
performed on real QKD systems. However the common
assumption on which most existing theoretical security
proofs are based is that the eavesdropper has no access
to receiving and transmitting equipment. However in real
life implementations she can influence the hardware of le-
gitimate user in some way and one need to take this into
consideration.
Thus possible attacks can generally be separated in
two categories. The first one is the attacks on quan-
tum states in the channel. In this field there are a huge
amount of works [3–8] that cover different aspects of the-
oretical security. All of them are based on consideration
of various properties of used states. A lot of techniques
were proposed for estimating the secure key since the
very fist days of QKD era. However some protocols still
do not have strict security proof. Some of them still have
open questions, i.e. the security proof for coherent-one-
way (COW) and deferential-phase-shift (DPS) protocols
against coherent attacks still do not exist.
Attacks on the hardware realization or so-called "quan-
tum hacking" belongs to the second category. There are
huge amount of possible attacks on the hardware real-
ization of QKD systems. One of the most crucial at-
tack, which can be implemented to the most types of
existing systems, is detector blinding or faked-state at-
tack [9–14]. A lot of experimental demonstrations of such
attack was proposed for different QKD systems. Many
researchers are trying to find the appropriate hardware
solution. Most of them are based on some modifications
of single-photon detectors (SPD). However there are still
no approved experimental solutions allowing to overcome
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this attack. The only reliable way to deal with such Eve’s
strategy yet is measurement-device-independent (MDI)
[15–20] or twin-field (TF) [21] QKD systems.
In this letter we propose the approach of how to
take into theoretical consideration the possibility of
eavesdropper’s interaction with Bob’s detection node by
considering quantum control attack assuming Eve may
"rule" Bob’s detector using appropriate states. Our ap-
proach is appropriate for protocols based on any partic-
ular kind of used states. Such clarification is important
since we can construct any appropriate positive-operator
valued measure (POVM). Different Eve’s strategies based
on various POVM constructions will be considered in this
paper.
General description of the attack. – Proposed in this
letter quantum controll attack relates to the class of
intercept-resend attacks. However, similar attacks was
considered earlier for different particular cases, for in-
stance in the paper [22] it was considered for the case
of single photons and in [23] for the case of linearly in-
dependent states. In this letter we present generalized
approach for any particular kind of states, however the
most crucial case is when linearly independent states are
used in the protocol. The protocol of the attack can be
described as follows:
(i) Eve exchanges the channel with lossless channel and
make her initial states (ancillas) |Ψ〉E interact with the
states prepared by Alice {|u1〉A, ..., |un〉A} using unitary
operator UAE
(ii) Eve constructs the appropriate POVM and mea-
sure her states that were interacted with Alice’s ones
{|Ψu1〉E , . . . , |Ψun〉E}
(iii) According to the measurement result she alter the
states in the channel using appropriate unitary operator
from polar decomposition of Kraus operator and impose
them to Bob by sending them directly to him. All dis-
tinguished by Eve states should be altered and resend
directly to Bob providing detection event with probabil-
ity maximally close to unity. Otherwise the appropriate
unitary operator (the detailed description could be found
further) should be applied to the states in the quantum
channel in order to prevent detection event on Bob’s de-
2tector.
It can be easily noted that this attack is quite similar
to the detector blinding attack. Let us clarify the state-
ment about detector blinding. The main idea of detec-
tor blinding attack is that the eavesdropper blinds Bob’s
avalanche detectors by irradiating the receiving equip-
ment with continuous wave (CW) laser radiation, thus
switching them into a linear classical mode (or appropri-
ate operation to control SNSPD detector). In case when
Eve distinguishes the state she performs detection event
at the Bob’s detector. Otherwise there will be no detec-
tion event the detector.
Lets consider several possible strategies of the attack
based on implementing different types of POVM to dis-
criminate the states. In the first case of linearly inde-
pendent states Eve can simply use unambiguous state
discrimination measurement and identify states without
errors, but with inconclusive results. The implementa-
tion of the attack and countermeasures was proposed in
[8, 24].
Nevertheless, it is not always possible to construct er-
rorless USD POVM. For example, there can be set of
more then two states, which are linearly dependent and
Eve cannot construct USD POVM. Thus she can dis-
criminate those states with some error probability and
without inconclusive results, e.g. [25].
However in general case Eve may construct arbitrary
POVM which contains both errors and inconclusive re-
sults (in particular she use the same detection scheme as
Bob does only assuming that her hardware is perfect or
at least better). Moreover this strategy is quite suitable
for experimental verification.
As it was mentioned above the proposed attack is based
on the fact that despite the structure of the states Eve
can provide some distinguishing measurement. Also very
important feature here is that we do assume the fact that
efficiency of our detector is not unit and there are always
losses in the channel and at the Bob’s side.
Thus the attack can be described as the extension of
(or general) intercept-resend attack assuming Eve can
control the Bob’s detector (equal to detector blinding).
Since the main idea of both attacks (quantum control
attack and detector blinding) is the imposing of discrim-
inated by Eve states to Bob, they can be considered al-
most similar. Lets consider it as follows.
Let A,B, E be Hilbert spaces of Alice, Bob and Eve
respectively and {|u1〉A, ..., |un〉A} is the space of states
prepared by Alice. At the beginning Alice’s states and
Eve’s initial states (ancillas) |Ψ〉E do not interact with
each other. To obtain any information about Alice’s
states they should somehow interact with Eve’s ancillas.
It can be provided by using some unitary operation UAE
as follows:

|u1〉A ⊗ |Ψ〉E
...
|un〉A ⊗ |Ψ〉E
UAE−−−→


|u˜1〉B ⊗ |Ψu1〉E
...
|u˜n〉B ⊗ |Ψun〉E
, (1)
where {|u˜1〉B, ..., |u˜n〉B} and {|Ψu1〉E , |Ψun〉E} are the
spaces of altered states in quantum channel and Eve’s
ancillas accordingly after Eve implies the unitary oper-
ation UAE . To impose any states Eve has to somehow
discriminate them before it (with inconclusive results, er-
rors, or both of them). According to the fact that this is
intercept-resend attack Eve has to distinguish every sin-
gle qubit. Since this Eve needs to construct the POVM
with the next family of positive semi-definite operators
{AxE}x∈X :
I =
∑
x
AxE . (2)
Since we consider that the attack is equivalent to the
detector blinding that means that Eve wants to control
Bob’s detector by altering the states in the channel. To
do so she must resend all the states where she got detec-
tion event and be sure that Bob will also have detection
event with probability equal to unity. All inconclusive re-
sults should be blocked. This can be done using unitary
decomposition technique (also called polar decomposition
or quantum control) [26–29] in order to alter the states in
the channel according to the measurement result. Thus
Eve can apply unitary decomposition to the elements of
POVM as follows:
KxEB = V
x
BE
(√
Ax
E
⊗ IB
)
, (3)
where KxEB is the Kraus operator, V
x
BE is the unitary op-
erator, which allows to alter the states after measurement
and index x denotes the set of possible outcomes of im-
plemented POVM. Such decomposition allows to realize
co-called feed-forward operation (quantum control). It
is quite similar to preparing the new states which form
dependence on the measurement results. Let us consider
the conditional probabilities of all possible outcomes ac-
cording to the generalized measurement:
P(?|ui) = TrE
(
A?E |Ψui〉E〈Ψui |
)
, (4)
P(uj|ui) = TrE
(
A
uj
E |Ψui〉E〈Ψui |
)
, (5)
here P(?|ui) denotes the conditional probabilities of in-
conclusive results measuring ui, here and further when
i = j we assume the case correct distinguishing, oth-
erwise with errors, thus P(uj |vi) denotes the conditional
probabilities of unambiguous discrimination if i = j, oth-
erwise the conditional probabilities of errors accordingly.
The most important thing about the discrimination
for Eve is the number of her detection events. Generally
it should be lower-bounded with Bob’s detection rate in
order that Eve can maintain the latter:
GE ≥ GB, (6)
with
GE = N · (P(ui|ui) + P(uj|ui)) , (7)
3where N is the number of sent by Alice qubits. The
states (in the channel and at the Eve’s side) after Eve’s
measurement can be presented as:
|u˜i〉B|Ψui?〉E =
√
A?E |u˜i〉B|Ψui〉E√
P(?|ui)
, (8)
|u˜i〉B|Ψu˜j 〉E =
√
A
uj
E
|u˜i〉B|Ψui〉E√P(uj|ui) , (9)
where {|Ψui?〉E , |Ψu˜j 〉E} are the states of Eve’s ancillas
after her measurement. However she do not obtain any
information from |Ψui?〉E since all of them relate to the
inconclusive results.
When the measurement is provided Eve can implement
feed-forward unitary operation as follows:
|u˜i〉B ⊗ |Ψ
ui?〉E V
∅
BE−−→ |˜˜u?i 〉B ⊗ |Ψ˜ui?〉E
|u˜i〉B ⊗ |Ψuj 〉E VBE−−→ |˜˜ui〉B ⊗ |Ψ˜uj 〉E
(10)
here {|˜˜ui〉B, |˜˜u?i 〉B} and {|Ψ˜ui?〉E , |Ψ˜uj 〉E} are altered
states after applying unitary operators VBE and V
∅
BE
in
quantum channel and at Eve’s side respectively, where
operators VBE and V
∅
BE
denotes unitary operators for con-
clusive result of the measurement and inconclusive out-
come respectively. In case of |Ψui?〉E Eve apply unitary
operator V ∅BE to |u˜i〉B changing it with vacuum states,
otherwise she increases the absolute value of their am-
plitudes. It should be mentioned, VBE can be chosen in
a way that from the Bob’s point of view there will be
no additional errors introduced by Eve despite she had
errors in her measurement results. Thereby Bob cannot
reveal Eve by monitoring the error rate. However, in
real-world implementation there is always errors due to
the non-ideality of equipment, POVM construction etc.
Thus Eve should maintain both errors and detection rate.
It can be done by constructing operators V ∅
BE
and VBE
in the way to maintain error and detection rates at the
Bob’s side: {
EE(ξ, ζ) = EB,
GE(ξ, ζ) = GB,
(11)
where EB and EE(ξ, ζ) is the expected error rate at the
Bob’s side and the error rate which should be provided
by Eve respectively. Here ξ and ζ are the parameters
to satisfy the conditions above (e.g. intensity and cod-
ing parameters changes respectively). According to the
overlapping preservation for unitary operation we assume
that
B〈u˜i|u˜j〉BE〈Ψi|Ψj〉E =B 〈˜˜uk|˜˜ul〉BE 〈Ψ˜k|Ψ˜l〉E , (12)
where indexes i, j denotes possible initial states at the
Alice and Eve’s side, and indexes k, l denotes possible
outcomes of the measurement including inconclusive re-
sult, correct distinguishing and error. Using proposed
technique Eve can maintain both detection and error
rates regarding to the presence of errors and inconclu-
sive results at the Bob side (they always appear due to
non-orthogonality of the states, losses in the channel and
non-ideal equipment). Generally also different possible
strategies can be applied to altering of the states. Since
in this work we are interested in imposing of states dis-
tinguished by Eve. Here Eve provides the case when she
exchanges all the states when she has inconclusive results
with vacuum states (using appropriate unitary operator)
and otherwise alters the states in the way to provide de-
tection event with probability maximally close to unity.
Thus this attack is closely related to the detector blinding
(faked-state) attack, since Eve impose her discriminated
states to Bob directly. However, Eve also can construct
her unitary operation in that way to maintain the states
in quantum channel and pretend that she does not inter-
act with them.
Example. – In this section let us consider the simplest
case with two linearly independent states. The space of
states prepared by Alice can be denoted as {|u〉A, |v〉A}.
The initial state of Eve’s states (ancillas) |Ψ〉E do not in-
teract with states prepared by Alice at the beginning. To
obtain any information about Alice’s states Eve should
somehow make them interact with her ancillas. It can be
provided by using some unitary operation UAE as follows:
{
|u〉A ⊗ |Ψ〉E
|v〉A ⊗ |Ψ〉E
UAE−−−→
{
|u˜〉B ⊗ |Ψu〉E
|v˜〉B ⊗ |Ψv〉E
, (13)
here {|u˜〉B, |v˜〉B} and {|Ψu〉E , |Ψv〉E} are the spaces of
altered states in quantum channel and Eve’s ancillas ac-
cordingly after Eve implies the unitary operation UAE .
Lets also assume that the overlapping of Eve’s states af-
ter applying unitary operation is denoted as follows:
w =E 〈Ψu|Ψv〉E . (14)
The elements of POVM, since we assume that discrimi-
nation probabilities should be the same for all states, can
be constructed using appropriate non-normalized vectors
on the same plane as the signal states, that can be de-
noted as follows:
|φu〉E = |Ψu〉E − µ|Ψv〉E , (15)
|φv〉E = µ|Ψu〉E − |Ψv〉E . (16)
Then positive semi-definite operators operators of POVM
can be denoted as follows:
AuE =
1
δ
|φu〉E〈φu|, (17)
AvE =
1
δ
|φu〉E〈φu|, (18)
A?E = 1−Au −Av, (19)
here parameter µ denotes the measurement regime of
POVM and δ optimizes POVM performance, reducing
4the probability of inconclusive result, but maintaining
the positive definiteness of operator A?E . Let us consider
the probabilities of all possible outcomes for one of the
states according to the Born rule:
P(u|u) = 1
δ
|E〈Ψu|φu〉E |2 = 1
δ
(1− µ · w)2 (20)
P(v|u) = |1
δ
|E〈Ψu|φv〉E |2 = 1
δ
(w − µ)2 (21)
P(?|u) = 1− P(u|u)− P(v|u), (22)
here P(?|u) denotes the probability of inconclusive re-
sult, P(u|u) and denotes the probability of unambiguous
discrimination and P(v|u) is the probability of errors ac-
cordingly. The vectors are chosen so that the matching
conditions are met:
P(u|u) = P(v|v), (23)
P(v|u) = P(u|v), (24)
P(?|u) = P(?|v). (25)
Eve’s detection rate can be obtained applying to the
states the next operator ADE :
ADE = A
u
E +A
v
E . (26)
Lets find the maximum eigenvalue λmax of this operator.
Optimization parameter δ is chosen then according to the
next condition:
λmax = 1. (27)
This condition allows us to reduce the average probability
of an inconclusive result and maintain the A?E operator’s
positive definiteness. Denote the eigenvector of the op-
erator as follows:
ADE |χ〉 = λ|χ〉, (28)
|χ〉 = α|Ψu〉E + β|ΨvE (29)
In the matrix form, the equation can be presented as:
1
δ
(
1 + µ2 − 2µ · w (1 + µ2)w − 2µ
(1 + µ2)w − 2µ 1 + µ2 − 2µ · w
)(
α
β
)
= λ
(
α
β
)
(30)
Assuming the following condition
2µ
1 + µ2
≥ w (31)
we obtain the solution:
λmax =
1
δ
(1− w)(1 + µ)2. (32)
Thus the probabilities of measurement outcomes can be
redefined as follows:
P(u|u) = (1 − µ · w)
2
(1− w)(1 + µ)2 , (33)
P(v|u) = (w − µ)
2
(1 − w)(1 + µ)2 , (34)
P(?|u) = (1 + w)(1 + µ)
2
(1− w)(1 + µ)2
(
2µ
1 + µ2
− w
)
. (35)
Lets consider different POVM strategies. The first case
is errorless USD POVM can be obtained if µ = w. Then
the probabilities of different outcomes has the next form:
P(u|u) = 1− w, (36)
P(v|u) = 0, (37)
P(?|u) = w (38)
However, if Eve implement such discrimination without
errors, she can be revealed by increasing the number of
states, since the discrimination probability is a function
of number of states.
Another degenerate case is when her discrimination
POVM does not produce any inconclusive results (mea-
surement in Breidbard basis[25]) can be obtained if the
following condition is satisfied
2µ
1 + µ2
= w, (39)
µ =
1−√1− w2
w
. (40)
In this case the detection rate GE is equal to unity, so
she can satisfy the condition in eq. 6. Then the proba-
bilities of different can be calculated using the following
expressions:
P(?|u) = 0, (41)
P(u|u) = w
2
2(1−√1− w2) , (42)
P(v|u) = w
2
2(1 +
√
1− w2) . (43)
Nevertheless in this case Eve produces a huge amount
of errors and can be easily revealed by error rates.
Thus the only way for her to provide the successful at-
tack is to implement the general case, then her POVM
has both errors and inconclusive results. It can be done
by changing a parameter µ. The simplest way to im-
plement such POVM is just to construct the same as
Bob’s one. If she does so the condition in eq. 6 will be
naturally satisfied, since Eve has ideal (or at least better)
equipment. To provide the attack successfully she should
satisfy the next condition:
N
(1− µ · w)2 + (w − µ)2
(1− w)(1 + µ)2 ≥ GB, (44)
It is quite obvious that µ can be chosen in that way to
satisfy the condition. The states after Eve measurement
can be presented as:
|u˜〉B|Ψu?〉E =
√
A?
E
|u˜〉B|Ψu〉E√
P(?|u) , (45)
|u˜〉B|Ψu˜〉E =
√
AuE |u˜〉B|Ψu〉E√
P(u|u) , (46)
|u˜〉B|Ψv˜〉E =
√
AvE |u˜〉B|Ψu〉E√
P(v|u) , (47)
5After measuring her states Eve should directly resend
all her discriminated states (both with error or with-
out) with probability equal or close to unity. As it was
shown in previous section she should apply unitary trace-
preserving operators VBE and V
∅
BE which should be con-
structed according to eq. 11 as follows:


|u˜〉B ⊗ |Ψu〉E VBE−−→ |˜˜u〉B ⊗ |Ψ˜u〉E
|u˜〉B ⊗ |Ψu?〉E V
∅
BE−−→ |˜˜u?〉B ⊗ |Ψ˜u?〉E
|u˜〉B ⊗ |Ψv〉E VBE−−→ |˜˜u〉B ⊗ |Ψ˜v〉E
, (48)
here {|˜˜u〉B, |˜˜u?〉B} and {|Ψ˜u〉E , |Ψ˜u?〉E , |Ψ˜v〉E} are the
states after applying operators VBE and V
∅
BE in quantum
channel and Eve’s ancillas accordingly to the measure-
ment outcome as it was shown in previous section. The
operator can alter the states in any appropriate way.
The possible countermeasures against such attack are
closely related with countermeasures against faked-state
attack. Since Eve should maintain the overlapping and
detection rate at the Bob’s side she should increase the
of the states. Thereby the possible way to reveal Eve is
to use photon-number-resolving (PNR) detectors which
allows to monitor the statistics of the radiation (e.g. the
common approach can be seen in [30]). Also the counter-
measure from [31] can be implemented. Another possible
solution is presented in [32], where coincidence detection
events are monitored.
Conclusion. – In this paper we present the technique
which allows Eve to provide so-called quantum control
attack. The attack is based on the fact, that Eve wants
to impose discriminated states to Bob and thus obtain
up to 100% of the shared key. We consider the general
case then Eve can implement any appropriate POVM
which allows her (or not) to obtain the necessary num-
ber detection events to maintain both detection and error
rates at the Bob’s side. The cornerstone of this paper is
that considered attack can be implemented to any states.
However not every suggested strategy can be realized suc-
cessfully if the proposed conditions are not satisfied by
Eve. Nevertheless, such technique allows us to take into
theoretical consideration the detector blinding quantum
hacking attack. Moreover we propose the possible coun-
termeasures for different types of the attack. This ap-
proach allows us to make theoretical security proofs more
accurate not only for ideal-world considerations but the
real-world implementations.
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